Given unified objectives of legitimacy, international cooperation, trade and the projection of national interests, arms-export is therefore sensible policy. Afterall, the arms-export value-chain creates direct/indirect employment, tax revenues, foreign-exchange earnings and enhances economic collaboration.
The flip-side is that the arms-importer will also, typically, benefit from lower tariffs, access to the exporter’s domestic market, ditto net employment gains in relevant industries. Thus, arms-exports create strategically balanced geopolitical advantages for contracting nations. For example, Nigeria exports crude oil to the United States and recently acquired 12 Apache helicopters, costing circa $1billion from the latter to prosecute mutually beneficial security policy goals. Straightforward!
However, pragmatic geopolitics defies seamless order. Because, oftentimes amongst sovereign nations, strategic interests collide given contested: air/land/maritime domains; political ideologies; UN Security Council manoeuvres; espionage; military and nuclear weapons ambitions; economics; IPRs; market-entry barriers; strategic technology; vaccine inequalities etc.
These cascading complexities, are further compounded by strategic alliances amongst super-powers, and their proxies, evinced in direct and indirect arms-exports to various factions in conflicts globally. Those dynamics challenge the quandary as to whether there is, or ever can be, morality in arms-exports given sovereign states’ toxic dilemma, of consistently promoting overriding strategic geopolitical and national interests!
Situating that proposition in real terms, are pivotal statistics demanding closer analysis. The State Department confirmed in January 2024, that U.S. arms-exports in 2023 increased 16 per cent to $238 billion. According to the authoritative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), through 2019-2023, the top ten global arms exporters were the United States (42 per cent); France 11 per cent; Russia (11 per cent); China (5.8 per cent) and Germany (5.6 per cent). Others were Italy (4.3 per cent); UK (3.7 per cent); Spain (2.7 per cent); Israel (2.4 per cent) and South Korea (2.0 per cent). An important outlier, Iran, holds 0.2 per cent of global arms-exports market-share.
Interrogating the data more closely within the same period, 15 per cent of the United States arms-exports were destined for Saudi Arabia; 9.5 per cent were imported by Japan and 8.2 per cent by Qatar. India received 34 per cent of Russia’s arms-exports, China received 21 per cent, whilst Egypt received 7.5 per cent. 23 per cent of the UK’s arms-exports went to Qatar; 20 per cent to the United States and 8.5 per cent to the Ukraine. Poland, the 14th largest global arms exporter, shifted 96 per cent of arms to Ukraine, whilst Canada the 15th largest arms exporter, transferred 22 per cent worth of equipment to Ukraine. 75 per cent of Iran’s arms-exports were Russia-bound and 7.4 per cent Yemeni Houthi-bound.
Just numbers, right? Wrong! Because, the scale, quantum and destinations of the arms-exports reflect the robustness of the geopolitical nexus between the arms exporting country and the arms importing nation. Equally, it illustrates the strategic priorities accorded to each contractual relationship between the exporting and recipient countries.
On that score, it addresses the hypothesis of arms-exports as one strictly between allies. It does not inherently address ethics and morality. Why not? The Russian/Ukrainian war, which commenced on February 24, 2022, pursuant to Russia’s invasion, has pitched the U.S. and NATO allies against Russia and its allies. Consequently, arms-exports procurement has, of necessity, increased by nations and proxies on opposing sides of the conflict.
Poland, illustrates the point. The country is bounded to the East, and Southeast by Ukraine and to the Northeast, by Belarus, Russia’s focal ally. From a geostrategic perspective, Poland, perceives Russia to be a real and present danger to its existence, which justifies its increased defence exports directly to Ukraine, and, indirectly via NATO. On that basis, 96 per centof Poland’s arms-exports are Ukraine-bound! This is driven as much by the need to safeguard national interests, as much as it is driven by trade motives.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are important strategic allies of the United States and NATO. The intensity of that nexus is partly exemplified by the momentous U.S. role in defending both countries, and Kuwait, during the 1990/1991 Persian Gulf wars against then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. It is also partly demonstrated by the fact that America’s largest military bases (used by NATO allies!) in the Middle East, Al-Adeid and Al- Udeid, are in Qatar; ditto several U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Equally, 23 per cent of UK arms-exports were to Qatar within the period in focus, demonstrating the significant strategic relations between both countries.
On its part, Russia, a nuclear superpower like the United States, is prosecuting a ferocious war against Ukraine, and is diametrically opposed to NATO, (which is arming Ukraine!). Through 2019-2023, it shifted 34 ;per cent and 21 per cent of arms-exports to India and China respectively; a reality which signifies resilient geopolitical interests between the Russian, Chinese and Indian trinity.
Now then, Western sanctions against Russia, pursuant to its decision to invade Ukraine have impeded its capacity to export arms at scale. It requires as much weaponry as it can obtain to effectively prosecute the Ukrainian war against unwavering Ukrainian/NATO opposition.
Inevitably, Russia has had to turn to Iran for weapons procurement. Unsurprisingly therefore, 75 per cent of Iranian arms-exports are Russia bound! Venezuela and Yemeni Houthis are recipients of 16 per cent and 7.4 per cent respectively of Iranian arms-exports.
Still on the moral conundrum, the rationale for sovereign nations’ arms export controls is underpinned by the philosophy of ensuring that those weapons are used solely for intended aims. Broadly, that is characterised as legitimate, proportionate self-defence; lawfully and reasonably preserving internal security law and order; safeguarding the strategic national interests of the arms exporter by interdicting re-exports to hostile counties and terrorists; preventing escalation of conflict amongst belligerent nations and parties et al. The inference there is safeguarding human rights and concurrently reinforcing geopolitical and strategic interests without breaching national sovereignty.
It is upon that overarching philosophy that the United States Foreign Assistance Act 1971, 22 USC 2378 (d) provides that “no assistance shall be furnished … to any unit of any security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”
Similar principles apply under the UK’s Export Control Act 2002 and the Export Control Order 2008, which regulate arms-exports, technical assistance and the transfer of dual use items. The approval and control mechanics extend to military equipment, goods on which military technology is recorded or from which it can be derived; goods intended, abridged or adapted for use in the development and production of military equipment or technology; and it includes technical assistance.
Furthermore, the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) (2013), effective December 24, 2014, is guided by that overarching philosophy and seeks to regulate international trade in conventional weapons. It also aims to prevent and eradicate illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion with the objective of international and regional peace, security and stability. The Treaty was signed by 130 countries.
However, it was not ratified by the United States, Ukraine, Israel. And, the ATT was not signed by Russia, Iran and Yemen. Interestingly, these countries are directly or indirectly engaged in conflicts relative to the Israeli/Palestinian war; Russia/Ukraine war; Yemen/Israel/Western Coalition Red Sea war!
Global attention has therefore focused on the geopolitics and morality of arms-exports against the backdrop of these wars especially; and in particular, the Israel/Palestinian war. It began October 7, 2023 following Palestinian Hamas attack on Israel, which killed approximately 1,200 people resulting in the hostage-taking of over 250 Israelis; over 111 were released.
Israel exercised its inherent right to legitimate self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel has concurrently responded with devastating force which has killed over 33,000 Palestinians, internally displaced over 2 million people in Gaza, with 2.1 million plus people facing starvation and devastation of swathes of Gaza, according to the UN. Serious claims of war crimes have been levelled against Israel and genocide allegations have been levelled against the state at the International Court of Justice by South Africa.
Against that backdrop, and defying objective international humanitarian concerns, the United States continues to export arms to Israel. According to The Washington Post, the Biden Administration has transferred over $153 million of tank components to Israel bypassing established Congressional oversight in what has been described by Josh Paul, ex senior State Department official “the arms transfer process lacks transparency by design”. Plus, the United States transfers $3.3 billion annually in military assistance to Israel.
The UK’s policy of arming Israel, whilst the latter persists in disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian targets like schools and hospitals has also come under fire from over 600 legal stalwarts. These include former Supreme Court Justices Lady Brenda Hale, Lord Jonathan Sumpton and Lord Nicholas Wilson who mutually wrote to the UK government in April 2024 contending that the country’s policy of arming Israel and the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the International Court of Justice’s conclusion, that there was a “plausible risk of genocide” in Gaza, compelled the UK to suspend arms-exports to Israel.
Summing up, the estimated global arms trade in 2022 was $2.24 trillion (SIPRI). Given the extant wars in Israel/Palestine, Russia/Ukraine, Sudan, Congo etc, it is reasonable to assume a much higher figure. That industry is megabucks for leading arms exporters and on economic grounds alone, the motive for defence spending will remain for the foreseeable future.
America’s strategic calculus is that Iran is a major threat insofar as it supplies weapons to Russia, Houthi rebels, Hezbollah and other groups perceived as working against western interests. Therefore, America needs a super-powerful Israel to limit Iran’s potency across and beyond the Middle East.
Accordingly, geostrategic and overriding national policy considerations supplant humanitarian concerns relative to arms-exports, thereby, sacrificing morality on the pedestal of uncompromising realpolitik.
Ojumu is the Principal Partner at Balliol Myers LP, a firm of legal practitioners and strategy consultants in Lagos, Nigeria, and the author of The Dynamic Intersections of Economics, Foreign Relations, Jurisprudence and National Development.
NwokeAgulu
